In listening to the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court, one particular exchange caught our ear with respect to Judge Ailto’s disposition towards victims who have been harmed by corporate negligence. The transcript reads from Thursday, January 12, reads in part as follows:
SCHUMER: … Let me just make -- I'm going to let you answer it. I just want to make the point here so everybody can understand. … this time it was the government had failed to raise the issue in the district court brief. This time you were prepared to excuse that failure. This time you felt it was appropriate to consider the issue on your own … I want to read what the majority in Smith v. Horn had to say about your indulgence of the government for failing to bring up an issue, …They said: "Where the state has never raised the issue at all, in any court, raising the issue ourselves puts us in the untenable position of ferreting out possible defenses upon which the state has never sought to rely. When we do so, we come dangerously close to acting as advocates for the state rather than as impartial magistrates." …
ALITO: Yes, Senator. As I was attempting to explain a couple of minutes ago, there is an important principle called the principle of comity that is involved in habeas cases. And it goes to a critical part of our concept of federalism, and it's something that Congress itself has very strongly recognized in the habeas corpus statute. What I'm talking about there is the doctrine of procedural default, which is very closely related to the doctrine of exhaustion. They go hand in hand. And what Congress has said in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is that on the issue of exhaustion, the court has to consider that even if the parties don't raise it.
SCHUMER: Now, that applies to the government as well as to the defendant?
ALITO: Absolutely. The issue of exhaustion must be considered by the federal habeas court, even if the state prosecutor does not raise the issue of exhaustion. And why did Congress say that? Congress said that because there's something more involved here than a dispute between the state prosecutor and the habeas petitioner; there is respect for the federal system of government involved. There is respect for the state court system involved.
SCHUMER: But the majority didn't agree with you in that situation, did they? ... I'm not sure I agree with it. But let me go on to another one. This is Dillinger. In this case, it was with a corporation. The case is Dillinger v. Caterpillar. And it's also a case where a party didn't raise an issue at trial -- won't have the same explanation as the habeas case, obviously. They didn't raise the issue at trial or on appeal -- this time the large company didn't: Caterpillar. And the majority held that it waived, and it sided with the plaintiff who was seriously injured in the accident, right?
ALITO: I don't have a recollection of all the facts...
SCHUMER: OK, well, let me tell you -- maybe this'll refresh your recollection. The majority wrote that it was not appropriate to exercise its discretion -- again it was the majority -- to excuse the defendant companies waiver when the consequence of the decision would be to deprive a seriously injured plaintiff of a trial in conformity with applicable law. That's the majority. You dissented, with the result, had you prevailed, that the accident victim's case would have been over. The majority describe your approach as follows. Quote: "There is an insurmountable procedural difficulty with Judge Alito's position. Caterpillar never advanced this argument at trial, an oversight that Judge Alito excuses on a ground that a district court decision may be affirmed on an alternative ground, though not advanced at trial." So in the Dillinger case, you also thought it was appropriate to use your discretion to excuse Caterpillar, isn't that right?
ALITO: Well, I'd have to refresh my recollection about exactly what was involved in the case...
SCHUMER: I would posit to you that, again, it was an example of your seeming to have more sympathy for a certain type of plaintiff than another.
SIDENOTE: It is a sign of the times we live in that sitting judges, academics, and other seemingly decent people continue to cling to the position that the execution of innocent persons is permissible under the U.S. Constitution. It is a position that sees the law in general and the Constitution in particular as a collection of static words disconnected from larger notions of ethics and justice. In an exchange with Senator Leahy, the nominee evaded directly stating an opinion and appears to adhere to this position. The transcript reads in relevant part:
LEAHY: ….In his confirmation hearing last September … I asked him if the Constitution permits the execution of an innocent person. He said, "If they've been falsely convicted and they're innocent, they shouldn't be in prison, let alone executed." I think we all agree with that. But I pushed further, because my question was whether the Constitution permits the execution of an innocent person -- you know that they're innocent. He said, "I would think not." Judge, do you agree with Chief Justice Roberts?
ALITO: … it is one of the most fundamental rights protected by our Constitution that no one may be convicted of an offense unless they're proven to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And further than that, the Supreme Court's decisions since 1976 dealing with the Eighth Amendment have attempted to create a whole set of procedural safeguards to make sure that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or capriciously…
LEAHY: But, Judge, we have, as we know -- we saw the cases in Illinois, people a few days away from execution. They'd been sentenced to death. They'd been convicted. They had their trial, gone to trial. Jury came back. Apparently procedures followed on sentencing. They are now sentenced to death. A few days before death, somebody comes forward at the very last minute because of DNA evidence, and says "Whoops, we got the wrong person," … We're finding in Virginia now, in other cases, it appears that there's a possibility a number of innocent people were executed. What if you had a case -- they've gone through the whole thing. They've been convicted. The judge has followed all of the appropriate sentencing, the jury came back for sentencing, did everything following the law. And now they're up for execution. Evidence comes up, say, DNA evidence, or DNA evidence, a confession of somebody else. Would it be unconstitutional then to execute that person?
ALITO: Well, Senator, it is unconstitutional to execute someone who has not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, depending...
LEAHY: They may have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, is what I'm saying. And then as a lot of these people were on death row and had to be commuted at the last moment when they -- a few days before the execution they found, whoops, they have the wrong guy.
ALITO: That's the ultimate tragedy that could possibly occur in our criminal justice system. We should do everything we can to prevent that from ever occurring. … If the evidence develops at the last minute, then I think -- and if this is -- it would depend to some degree on -- the procedures would be different, depending on whether the person had been convicted in state court or in federal court. …
LEAHY: But you agree with -- I understand all the steps. Like you, I was a prosecutor. Even though we don't have death sentence in Vermont, we have real life imprisonment. And I remember those. But you agree, though, with Chief Justice Roberts that the Constitution does not countenance the execution of an innocent person?
ALITO: The Constitution is designed to prevent that.